

## Message Text

PAGE 01 SALT T 00119 01 OF 02 272040 Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 ( ADP ) W

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O P 271945 Z MAR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1892

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0119

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 27, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED BY  
MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1973.

WE TOOK NOTE OF YOUR STATEMENT ON MARCH 23, 1973 THAT THE US  
SIDE SUPPORTS THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY  
OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IN REGARD TO THE PROBLEMS BEFORE US.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT CONSISTENT OB-  
SERVANCE OF THIS PRINCIPLE IN RELATION TO THE MATTERS ASSIGNED TO  
US WOULD CREATE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR DEVELOPING MUTUALLY  
ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD ADVANCE US IN THE DIRECTION OF  
WORKING OUT FURTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON  
THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED IN THIS AREA, WITH  
THE AIM OF EXPANDING THE RESULTS ACHIEVED AT THE MAY 1972 SUMMIT  
MEETING.

IN THIS CONNECTION, BEING GUIDED BY THE AGREED PRINCIPLES PER-  
TAINING TO OUR NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP IN MIND THE  
NATURE OF THE WORK WHICH IS AHEAD OF US BECAUSE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS  
WE HAVE, AND SPECIFICALLY TO GIVE ATTENTION TO IDENTIFYING THOSE  
PROMISING AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH ARE OR MAY BECOME RIPE FOR  
SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00119 01 OF 02 272040 Z

AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION THAT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN WORKING

OUT A BROADER AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS.

OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TASK BEFORE US OF SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS COMPLEX AND HAS MANY ASPECTS. THIS ALSO INDICATES THE USEFULNESS OF THE ONGOING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. AFTER RESUMPTION OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON MAR 12, 1973 IN GENEVA THE USSR DELEGATION DIRECTED THE ATTENTION OF THE US SIDE TO A WHOLE SERIES OF IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM UNDER CONSIDERATION, WHICH AWAIT SOLUTION. TODAY, IN CONTINUING TO SET FORTH THE USSR POSITION I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS STILL ANOTHER ASPECT THEREOF, WHICH IS OF SUBSTANTIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN THE COURSE OF PRECEDING DISCUSSIONS, AS WELL AS AT THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, BOTH THE SOVIET AND THE US SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN AND FURTHER ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY. A RELIABLE WAY TO ENSURE STRATEGIC STABILITY IS FOR THE SIDES TO TAKE FURTHER AGREED MEASURES, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH WOULD LIMIT THEIR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN THIS CONNECTION, ALONG WITH SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO QUESTIONS OF QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WE SHOULD EVIDENTLY SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ESTABLISH SOME KIND OF LIMITS ON THEIR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT.

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. ADOPTION BY THE SIDES OF AGREED STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT MEASURE, CONTRIBUTING TO EFFECTIVE CURBING OF THE RACE IN THESE ARMAMENTS.

DURING THE MAY 1972 MEETING IN MOSCOW THE HIGHEST AUTHORITIES OF THE USSR AND THE US GAVE A PRAMOUNT ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE RESULTS OF THAT MEETING INDICATE A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THAT FURTHER MEASURES CONTRIBUTING TO THE REDUCTION OF THIS RISK ARE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

IN THIS CONNECTION, MR AMB, I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU THAT ALREADY AT THE LAST PHASE THE USSR DELEGATION ADVANCED A PROPOSAL NOT TO DEVELOP OR TEST NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND WOULD THEREFORE BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE GOALS OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN GENEVA THE US SIDE, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, MANIFESTED A CERTAIN INTEREST IN THE POSSIBLE CONTENT OF SUCH A MEASURE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 SALT T 00119 01 OF 02 272040 Z

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ASSUMPTION OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD OF ITSELF DIMINISH THE GROUNDS FOR A RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRIES AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AS A WHOLE. ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD ALSO BE IN ACCORD WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, OBLIGATES OUR COUNTRIES TO "PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES RELATING TO CESSATION OF THE

NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AT AN EARLY DATE".

OF COURSE, IN SUBMITTING A PROPOSAL THAT THE SIDES ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP OR TEST NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT IT WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES EQUALLY.

CONSIDERATION OF THIS PROPOSAL OF THE USSR MEETS THE DESIRE EXPRESSED BY BOTH SIDES TO UNDERTAKE MEASURES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT DIRECTION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THIS CONNECTION, MEASURES FOR BANNING SOME SPECIFIC TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH ARE NOT COVERED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, COULD ALSO BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. AN UNDERSTANDING ON BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOLVING URGENT SPECIFIC TASKS OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT MANY TYPES OF SUCH ARMAMENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXTENSIVELY DEPLOYED OR NOT DEPLOYED AT ALL, AGREEMENT ON SUCH MEASURES APPEARS TO BE TIMELY AND POSSIBLE.

AN UNDERSTANDING COULD, FOR INSTANCE, PROVIDE FOR AN UNDERTAKING ON THE PART OF THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP OR TEST STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES ( OTHER THAN SUBMARINES), AS WELL AS ON ANY FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INTERNAL WATERS. AN ANALOGOUS OBLIGATION COULD BE ASSUMED WITH RESPECT TO INTERCONTINENTAL CURISE MISSILES.

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, A PROXIMITY OF VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS BECAME APPARENT AT PREVIOUS PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE CAUSE OF LIMITING THE ARMS RACE WOULD ALSO BE SERVED BY BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS, AS WELL AS OF LONG- RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES. A MUTUAL UNDERTAKING BY THE SIDES IN THIS RESPECT WOULD ESTABLISH LIMITS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC AVIATION AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL SUPPLEMENT TO OTHER LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS OF THIS TYPE,

SECRET

PAGE 04 SALT T 00119 01 OF 02 272040 Z

WHICH WERE PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON MARCH 23.

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PAGE 01 SALT T 00119 02 OF 02 272110 Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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O P 271945 Z MAR 73  
FM USDEL SALT TWO II  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1893  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0119

EXDIS SALT

LET US ASSUME, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT ONE OF THE SIDES BEGAN TO DEVELOP A NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC BOMBER. ACTIONS OF THIS KIND COULD LEAD TO THE POTENTIAL DANGER OF UPSETTING STRATEGIC STABILITY, SINCE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS OF A NEW TYPE WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE DANGER OF UPSETTING STRATEGIC STABILITY WOULD BE INCREASED IF THE SIDES WERE ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING LONG RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES, WHOSE CAPABILITIES ARE COMMENSURATE WITH CERTAIN OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. A BAN ON LONG RANGE AIR- TO- SURFACE MISSILES ENSUES FROM THE POLICY ADOPTED BY OUR GOVERNMENTS TO LIMIT THOSE WEAPONS AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCING STABILITY.

AN UNDERSTANDING ON BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS COULD ALSO EXTEND TO SOME OTHER SYSTEMS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT HAS BEEN SET FORTH ABOVE, THE USSR DELEGATION IS AUTHORIZED TO SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING PROPOSAL:

GUIDED BY THE URGENT INTERESTS OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE SIDES WILL BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DE- PLOYMENT OF CERTAIN TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SUCH AS:

- A) NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT;
- B) LONG RANGE AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES;
- C) INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES AND SEA- BASED CRUISE MISSILES, SPECIALLY DEVELOPED TO STRIKE LAND TARGETS;
- D) STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SECRET

PAGE 02 SALT T 00119 02 OF 02 272110 Z

SUBMARINES;

- E) STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIRBORNE PLATFORMS;
- F) ANY FIXED OR MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACE ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUB- SOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INTERNAL WATERS.

WE HOPE THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE US SIDE WITH DUE ATTENTION AND MET WITH APPROPRIATE UNDER- STANDING. OF COURSE, WE ARE ALSO READY TO LISTEN TO POSSIBLE CON- siderations OF THE US SIDE ON THIS SCORE.

MR. AMB, IN THE COURSE OF THE PRECEDING GENEVA PHASE THE US SIDE RAISED THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING AN EQUAL AGGREGATE CEILING ON ICBM THROWWEIGHT FOR EACH SIDE. THIS PROPOSAL HAS BEEN REPEATED DURING THE CURRENT PHASE AS WELL. I HAVE TO STATE THAT THIS MATTER WAS CAREFULLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIET SIDE

IN PREPARATION FOR THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SUCH A FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION IS UNFOUNDED. IN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO SINGLE OUT AS A CONDITION FOR AN UNDERSTANDING ONE ARBITRARILY SELECTED PARAMETER FOR ONE TYPE OF SUCH ARMAMENTS. AS FOR ICBMS, THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IS NO LESS DEPENDENT ON A NUMBER OF OTHER VERY IMPORTANT FACTORS. IN DEVELOPING STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS EACH SIDE MAKES USE OF THOSE TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS WHICH IT CONSIDERS EFFICIENT AND WHICH GIVE IT THE NECESSARY SECURITY. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE USSR DELEGATION OF DEC 8, 1972 THAT THIS QUESTION, TOO, IN ESSENCE FOUND ITS SOLUTION IN THE AGREED PROVISIO

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